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12.1. Introduction 
In the early morning of 11 March 2012, a US service member, Staff Ser-
geant Robert Bales, slipped undetected from Village Stability Platform 
('VSP') Belambai about 30 kilometres from Kandahar, Afghanistan. 
Bales was one of approximately 40 US military personnel deployed to 
VSP Belambai. Their mission was "to assist the Afghan government in 
maintaining security, reconstructing the country, training the national po-
lice and army, and providing a lawful environment for free and fair elec-
tions" .1 Sergeant Bales, however, was on a very different mission. 
Bales, alone and on foot, hiked to two separate Afghan villages 
where he murdered 16 women and children, attempted to murder six more 
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United States Mission to NATO, "U.S. Policy Toward Afghanistan and Pakistan: A Dos-
sier (2014)", available at http://nato.usmission.gov/atghanistan.html, last accessed on 27 
March 2015. 
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and assaulted others.2 The victims ranged in age from small children to an 
elderly grandmother. Bales murdered 1 J members of one family, shooting 
most of them in front of each other, stomped to death at least one victim, 
and set 10 victims' bodies on fire. The US Army apprehended Bales as he 
attempted to return to VSB Belambai. The Army transferred Bales to the 
United States and prosecuted him under US military's criminal law and 
procedure, the Uniform Code of Military Justice ('UCMJ'). At an Army 
court martial held in June 2013 in the US, Bales plead guilty to 16 counts 
of premeditated murder, six counts of attempted murder and six counts of 
aggravated assault inflicting grievous bodily injury. A military panel, or 
jury, sentenced Bales to be dishonourably discharged and to be confined 
for the duration of his natural life without the possibility of parole. 
In so doing, the US Anny continued its long-standing policy and 
practice of asserting jmisdiction over its service members who commit 
crimes during armed conflict, and charging them with enumerated of-
fences of the UCMJ rather than violations of the laws of war or war 
crimes. Yet, while not prosecuting its own service members with such 
crimes, the US continues to conduct military commissions at Guantanamo 
Bay, Cuba and to prosecute members of al-Qa'ida and the Taliban for just 
such offences, that is, violations of the laws of war. 3 
This chapter explores the aspects of self-interest implicated by the 
US military prosecuting its own service members who violate the laws of 
war under different criminal charges than it prosecutes enemy belligerents 
who commit substantially similar offences. The chapter briefly explains 
how the US asserts criminal jurisdiction over its service members before 
turning to how the US military reports violations of the laws of war. It 
then sets out the US methodology for charging such violations as applied 
to its service members, and compares this methodology to that applied to 
those tried by military commissions. The chapter then discusses the varied 
meanings of the tenn 'war crimes' and the way in which the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions can provide a benchmark against which the elements of of-
fences, and their punishments, can be compared. While the US practice 
fares adequately in this comparison, the argument for a pragmatic ap-
2 United States v. Rober! Bales, Charge Sheet, 23 March 2012 (redacted). A copy ofBales's 
charge sheet is appended to this chapter as Appendix I. 
~ A copy of charge sheet from the US military commissions is appended to this chapter as 
Appendix2. 
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proach to charging over the expressive value of a war crime charge is ren-
dered untenable as a result of the disparate manner in which the US 
charges detainees when compared to its own service members. Ultimately, 
this chapter recommends adding armed conflict-related punitive articles to 
the UCMJ and increasing transparency in how the US holds its service 
members accountable for violations of the law of war. 
12.2. United States Practice 
12.2.l. A History of the UCMJ 
The UCMJ came from the US Congress's desire, following the Second 
World War, to establish "a code that would apply to all branches of the 
military and create greater uniformity in the ub ·tanlive and procedural 
law governing the administration of military justicc".4 While the UCMJ 
dates from 1951, its origins are in and with the founding of the US during 
the American Revolutionary War with Britain. In June 1775, the fledgling 
(and rebellious) Second Continental Congress enacted the Articles of 
War, which, somewhat ironically, were "generally a copy of the then-
existing code governing England's Army". 5 Following the Revolutionary 
War, the US Constitution granted the US Congress the power "( 1) to 
make Rules for the Government and Regulation of land and naval 
Forces"; and "(2) the power to define and punish[ ... ] offenses against the 
Law of Nations".6 Thus, beginning with the 1806 revisions to the Articles 
of War, US "military personnel were subject to a code that required them 
to obey certain laws and customs of war or face trial by court-maiiial or 
military tribunal". 7 In the century that followed, the US Congress updated 
6 
Mynda Ci. Ohman, "Integrating Title 18 War Crimes into Title 10: A Proposal to Amend 
the U11ifor111 Code of Military .Justice", in Air Fnrce Law Review, 2005, vol. 57, p. 4. 
Judge Advocate General's Corps, US Army, The Army Lawyer: A Hislory <f lhe Judge 
Advocate General's Co1ps, 1775-1975, Govern111ent Printing Office, Washington, DC, 
1975. The following month the Congress elected William Tudor as the first Judge Advo-
cate General of the Army. 
United States Constitution, Art. I, § 8, Cl. 14. See also Tara Lee, "A111cricm1 Courts-
Mnrtial for Enemy War Crimes", in Unil'ersity <~(Baltimore Law Review, 2003, vol. 33, 
pp. 52-53. 
Eric Talbot Jensen and James J. Teixeira Jr., "Prosecuting Members of the U.S. Military 
for Wartime Environmental Crimes", in Georgetown International E1111iro11menta/ Law 
Review, 2005, vol. 17, no. 4, p. 658. 
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the Articles of War in 1874 and 1916. 8 The articles were again amended 
in 1920, with lessons learned from the First World War, and in 1949 fol-
lowing the Second World War. 9 The 195 J UCMJ replaced the Articles of 
War and established "a single codified system of military law, separate 
from the criminal justice systems of the various states and of the Article 
Ill [federal] courts". 10 The features of the UCMJ have been described as 
follows: 
The UCMJ permanently transformed the nature of military 
law. The UCMJ was more than a structural change to ensure 
uniformity across all branches of service. It added a1iicles, 
defined new crimes, and established rules designed to protect 
the substantive and procedural rights of military personnel. 
New provisions designed to ensure a fair trial included the 
right against self-incrimination; equal process for the defense 
and prosecution to obtain witnesses and depositions; the pro-
hibition on receiving guilty pleas in capital cases; the re-
quirement that both prosecution and defense counsel be le-
gally trained; the right for an enlisted accused to be tried by a 
panel [military jury] that included enlisted members; the re-
quirement that the law officer (now the military judge) in-
struct the panel members on the record regarding the ele-
ments of the offense, presumption of innocence, and burden 
of proof; the provision mandating that voting on findings and 
sentencing be conducted by secret ballot; and an automatic 
review of the trial record. 11 
One of the advantages of the UCMJ is its broad jurisdictional scope: 
The UCMJ applies to all [US] service members regardless of 
whether the offense can be tied to military discipline and ef-
fectiveness. The UCMJ is applicable both in the United 
States and in foreign countries. Because the UCMJ applies 
worldwide, a court-martial convened under the UCMJ may 
be held anywhere in the world. This flexibility allows for the 
prosecution to take place near the situs of the crime, pre-
sumably near the location of any relevant witnesses. This 
makes the prosecution of a crime that occurs during the con-
Ohman, 2005, p. 4, see supra note 4. 
9 Ibid. 
111 Lee, 2003, pp. 52 -53, see supra note 6. 
u Ohman, 2005, pp. 9-10, see supra note 4. 
FICHL Publication Series No. 25 (2015) - page 264 
Self-Interest or Self-Inflicted'? 
How the US Charges Its Service Members for Violating the Laws of War 
duct of military operations, such as in Iraq [or Afghanistan], 
easier than it would be if the case had to be heard in a Fed-
eral District Court or before an international body convened 
at the Hague or some other site distant from the court's loca-
tion.12 
For the UCMJ to exercise personal jurisdiction over US service 
members regardless of where in the world the service member is or 
whether they were on or off duty is one of the strengths of the system. But 
the manner in which the system charges US service members for crimes 
blunts the efficacy, either real or perceived, of the UCMJ as an account-
ability mechanism. More confusing still is that the link between jurisdic-
tion and charging, the reporting of alleged violations by US service mem-
bers is conducted using law of war terms. 
12.2.2. Reporting US Service Member Violations of the Laws of War 
The US Department of Defense ('DoD') i sued a directive on its law of 
war programme in 2006. 1 ~ The directive's tated purpose is to "update the 
policies and responsibilities ensuting DoD compliance with the law of 
war obligations of the United States". 14 The directive also clarifies inves-
tigation and reporting of "reportable incidents". 15 The directive defines 
the law of war as: 
That part of international law that regulates the conduct of 
armed hostilities. It is often called the "law of armed con-
flict''. The law of war encompasses all international law for 
the conduct of hostilities binding on the United States of its 
individual citizens, including treaties and international 
agreement~ t() which the United States is a party, and appli-
cable customary intcmational law. 16 
12 Jensen and Teixeira, 2005, p. 658, see rnpra note 7. Allhough one of the advantages of the 
UCMJ is the ability to hold courts martial in a combat theatre such as Iraq or Afghanistan, 
it is noteworthy that often the US military does not choose this course of action. As dis-
cussed in the introduction, Staff Sergeant Bales committed his crimes in Atghanistan and 
against Afghan civilians, but Balcs's cou1t martial was held in the US. 
13 US Department of Defense ('DoD') Directive 2311.0IE, DoD Law of War Program, 9 
May 2006. 
14 Ibid., para. 1.l. 
1 ~ Ibid. 
16 Ibid., para. 3.1. 
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The directive then states that "[i]t is DoD policy that:[ ... ] Members of the 
DoD Components comply with the law of war during all armed conflicts, 
however such conflicts are characterized, and in all other military opera-
tions" .17 The combination of how the US defines the law of war and the 
policy decision to broadly apply it is, or could be, significant. It is signifi-
cant because the US is claiming that its service members comply with the 
law governing international armed conflict, non-international armed con-
flict and even "applicable" customary international law in all armed con-
flicts, and even all other military operations, including for example, 
peacekeeping. 
This could be the bridge over what is otherwise a significant gap 
stemming from the problematic inverse relationship between frequency of 
the type of anned conflict (intemational and non-international) and the 
applicable governing law. The vast majority of the law of armed conflict, 
including all four of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their Additional 
Protocol I, is only triggered as a matter of law by international armed con-
flict. Yet there are few international armed conflicts. In contrast, non-
international armed conflicts are far more prevalent, 18 but for which there 
is far less law. The US policy directive would avoid that problem, but 
only if it were clear what portions of the law of armed conflict the US is 
applying, which it is not. Indeed, an unprivileged belligerent the US is 
detaining at the time of writing at Naval Station Guantanamo Bay, Cuba 
has filed a legal challenge complaining ot: among other thiJ1gs, the spe-
cific portions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions the US is not following. 19 
17 Ibid., parn. 4.1. 
JH For example, according to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation ('NATO'), in 2000 there 
were 25 armed conflicts around the world. NATO, "Statistics on armed conflicts around 
the world", available at http://nalo.gov .si/eng/topic/threats-to-security/statistics/, last ac-
cessed on 29 March 2015. Of those, only one, the conflict between India and Pakistan, wns 
of an international nature. Sec also Armed Conflict Database, available at 
http://acd.iiss.org, last accessed on 29 March 2015. 
19 Sec United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, Abdullah v. Obama, 753 
F.3d 193, 4 April 2014. Abdullah claimed that his conditions of confinement violated the 
Third Gcncvn Convention governing prisoners of war because "he is not permitted to pm-
chase personal items, family and friends arc nol allowed to send him food or clothing, de-
tainees cannot choose representatives to air their grievances and copies of the Geneva 
Convention arc not posted in prominent places" (p. 196). The United Stutes Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia denied Abdullah 's appc.:a l on the grounds his claim was 
"only a bare and conclusory assertion that" the US government was in vio lation of ce1t11in 
sections of the Third Geneva Convention. fodecd, this footnote is considerably longer than 
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Similarly, the policy claims that US service members will follow 
"applicable" customary international law, without specifying which or 
what law that is. As discussed later in the chapter, the US has objected to 
the International Committee of the Red Cross' ('ICRC') customary inter-
national humanitarian law study. It would be helpful if the US, indeed all 
States, were to acknowledge what they consider customary international 
law. ln the absence of such specification, claiming to follow "applicable" 
customa1y international law is close to, if not fully, a meaningless claim. 
Implementing and applying law as a matter of policy when that law 
would not otherwise apply should be a positive development. And it was 
the US practice during the Vietnam War. There, the Americans con-
fronted a similar challenge as today, fighting one or more organised 
armed groups, includi1Jg the Viet Cong, who, like al-Qa'ida today, do not 
qualify as prisoners of war under the Third Geneva Convention.20 In con-
Abdullah's claim, which, in toto, was "Respondents are now, and have been for a decade, 
violating sections 3, 25, 70-72, and 78-79". 
20 To quality for prisoner of war status under Geneva Convention JII, an individual must fall 
in one of the following categories: 
(1) Members of the armed forces ofn party to the conflict as well as members of militia 
or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces. 
(2) Members of other militias und members of other volunteer corps, including those of 
organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in 
or outside their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, provided that such 
militias or volunteer corps, including such organized resistance movements, fulfil the 
following conditions: 
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; 
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; 
(c) that of carrying arms openly; 
( d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of 
war. 
(3) Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or an au-
thority not recognized by the Dctaini11g Power. 
(4) Persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being members thereof, 
such as civilian members of military aircraft crews, war correspondents, supply con-
tractors, members of labour units or of services responsible for the welfare of the 
armed forces, provided that they have received authorization from the armed forces 
which they accompany, who shall provide them for that purpose wilh an identity 
card similar to the annexed model. 
(5) Members of crews, including masters, pilots and apprentices, of the merchant marine 
and the crews of civil aircraft of the Parties to the conflict, who do not benefit by 
more favourable treatment under any other provisions of international law. 
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trast, members of the North Vietnamese Anny did qualify for prisoner of 
war status. The US Military Assistance Command in Vietnam's 
('MACV') response was to issue an instruction, functionally the equiva-
lent of the current directive. Through that instruction, the US still con-
ducted the review process to determine if a captured belligerent qualified 
as a matter of law for prisoner of war status. For the Viet Cong, who did 
not qualify as a matter of law, the instruction stated that the US, as a mat-
ter of policy, would treat them as prisoners of war. The result was two 
identically run prison camps, separated by a road. In one camp were 
members of the North Vietnamese Army, who were entitled to prisoner of 
war treatment as a matter of law. In the other camp were the Viet Cong, 
who were not entitled to prisoner of war status as a matter of law but re-
ceived the same treatment as a matter of policy. The ICRC was effusive in 
its praise of the US policy decision, claiming that 
[t]he MACY instruction [ ... ] is a brilliant expression of a 
liberal and realistic attitude. [ ... )This text could very well be 
a most important one in the history of the humanitarian law, 
for it is the first time [ ... ] that a government goes far beyond 
the requirements of the Geneva Convention in an official in-
struction to its armed forces. The dreams of today are the 
rarities of tomorrow, and the day those definitions or similar 
ones will become embodied in an international treaty [ ... ] 
will be a great one for man concerned about the protection of 
men who cannot protect themselves. [ .. . ) May it then be re-
membered that this li~ht first shone in the darkness of this 
tragic war of Vietnam. 1 
The difference between the application of the US militaty's policy 
decisions then and now is that in Vietnam, the US was transparent about 
the law it was applying and thus could be monitored and inspected. The 
( 6) Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the approach of the enemy spontane-
ously take up arms to resist the invading forces, without having had time to form 
themselves into regular mmed units, provided they can-y arms openly nnd respect the 
laws and customs of war. 
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949, UST. 
3316, Art. 4 ('Geneva Convention III'). 
21 Laurie Blank and Gregory Noone, //l/emational Law and Armed Co11flict: Fundamental 
Pl'inc:1jiles and Customary Challenges in the law rif War, Aspen Publishers, Aspen, 2013, 
p. 232, citing George S. Prugh, Vietnam Studies: Law at War: Vietnam 1964-1973, De-
partment of the Army, Washington, DC, 1975. 
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current policy directive unfortunately falls far short of its Vietnam era 
predecessor. 
Having established the vague policy footing on which the current 
directive rests, it is surprisingly expansive and specific in what qualifies 
as a reportable law of war violation. The directive defines reportable inci-
dent as "[a] possible, suspected, or alleged violation of the law of war, for 
which there is credible information, or conduct during military operations 
other than war that would constitute a violation of the law of war if it oc-
curred during an armed conflict".22 When the low threshold of a possible, 
suspected or alleged violation is reached, "[a]ll reportable incidents com-
mitted by or against US personnel, enemy persons, or any other individu-
als are reported promptly, investigated thoroughly, and, where appropri-
ate, remedied by corrective action".23 
The directive speaks in tenns of violations of the law of war and re-
quires their repo11ing and investigation. Yet if that investigation substanti-
ates the violation, the US military takes the next step in its self-
accountability process, charging the alleged wrongdoer, but not with a 
violation of the law of war. 
12.2.3. Charging Violations of the Laws of War 
As one US Army lawyer noted in a primer for the practitioner of charging 
war crimes: "The first step in analyzing how to charge the servicemember 
is to look for any offenses specifically enumerated in the UCMJ Articles 
80 tlu-ough 132" .24 These articles address a wide range of criminal con-
22 DoD Directive 2311.0IE, DoD Law of War Program, 9 May 2006, para. 3.2. 
23 Ibid., para. 4.4. 
24 Martin N. White, "Charging Wm Crimes: A Primer for the Practitioner", in The Army 
Lawyer, 2006, vol. 2, p. 2. As White explains, "[t]he [service lawyer prosecutor] should 
begin with this analysis due to the preemption doctrine. The preemption doctrine 'prohibits 
application of Article 134 to conduct covered in Articles 80 through 132"' (p. 2). Article 
134 is for misconduct not addressed in the enumernted punitive section of the UCMJ. Arti-
cle 134 of the UCMJ, among other things, allows for the incorporation of federal offences 
as 11 military charge. But under the preemption doctrine, a prosecutor may not incorporate 
a federal charge to address conduct an enumerated article of the UCMJ covers. For exam-
ple, Article 118 of the UCMJ criminalises murder. The US Code, in Title 18 § 1111 also 
criminalises murder. So a military prosecutor would need to charge the murder offence 
under Article 118; he or she could not incorporate the federal murder offence through Ar-
ticle 134. However, unlike the UCMJ, the US Code specifically criminalises war crimes as 
such, in Title 18 * 2441. This raises the question of whether a military prosecutor could in-
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duct, and include both completed and inchoate offences. The crimes listed 
in the UCMJ include common offences such as larceny, assault, rape and 
murder, and arcane offences, such as abusing a public animal and jumping 
from a vessel to the water. There is no enumerated offence for violating 
the laws of war. Yet the UCMJ itself acknowledges that "[t]o the extent 
permitted by the [US] Constitution, comis-martial may try any offense 
under the code, and in the case of a general comis-martial, the law of 
war".25 
In explaining how to allege offences, the current US Manual for 
Courts-Martial provides that "[a] charge states the article of the code, law 
of war, or local penal law of an occupied territory which the accused is 
alleged to have violated". 26 Not only docs this indicate the possibility of a 
law of war charge, the accompanying discussion details that "[i]n the case 
of a person subject to trial by general court-martial for violations of the 
law of war, the charge should be: 'Violation of the Law of War"'.27 But 
that discussion concludes with the guidance that "[ o ]rdinarily persons 
subject to the code [a category which includes US service members] 
should be charged with a specific violation of the code rather than a viola-
tion of the law of war".28 Likewise, the Department of the Army's field 
corporate the federal statute under Article 134 and thus charge a US service member with 
war crimes. The answer where the underlying conduct is reflected in a punitive article is 
imclear. For example, if a military prosecutor incorporated the federal war crimes statute 
and charged a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions, the unlawful killing of a protected 
person, the defense would challenge such a charge under the preemption doctrine, arguing 
that A11icle 118 of the UCMJ already addresses unlawful killing. Butt() the extent the un-
derlying conduct is not reflected in a punitive article of the UCMJ, charging the conduct as 
a war crime through Article 134 and the federal statute appears a possibility. The challenge 
is to idenlily acts which constitute a grave breach of the Geneva C()nventions or violate 
Common Article 3 and which are not already reflected in a punitive a11icle ofthc UCMJ. 
25 United States Military, Ma1111alfor Courts-Martial, Rules for Courts-Martial r 202, 2012. 
Sec also Uniform Code ofMilitmy Justice, 10 USC§ 818, Art. 18, 2010. 
26 United States Military, Manual for Courts-Martial, Rules for Courts-Martial r 307(c)(2), 
2012. 
27 ibid., Discussion (D). 
28 ibid. The analysis of that rule, also contained in the Manual jiJr Courls-Marlial, adds little 
clarity. The appendix to the 1969 Manual jiu· Co11rts-Marlial merely states that "[i]n the 
case of a person subject to trial by general court-ma11ial by the law of war[ ... ], the Charge 
should be: 'Violation of the Law of War'", Manualfilr Courls-Martial (1969), Appendix 
6a at 12. That same manual lists as a source of military jurisdiction, international law, 
which it states includes the laws of war. 
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manual The law <~f land Warfare, in a section entitled "Persons Charged 
With War Crimes" states that: 
The United States normally punishes war crimes as such 
only if they are committed by enemy nationals or by persons 
serving the interests of the enemy State. Violations of the 
law of war committed by persons subject to the military law 
of the United States will usually constitute violations of the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice and, if so, wiIJ be prose-
cuted under that Jaw.29 
That guidance, while not styled as an absolute requirement, has proved to 
be one in US practice. For example, the US charged Lieutenant William 
Calley with violating Article 118, murder, of the UCMJ, for his role in the 
My Lai massacre during the Vietnam War. There is considerable similar-
ity between the charges against Calley and Bales. Calley was charged as 
follows: 
In that First Lieutenant William L. Calley, Jr. [ ... ] did, at My 
Lai 4, Quang Ngai Province, Republic of South Viet-Nam, 
on or about I 6 March 1968, with premeditation, murder an 
unknown numbe.r, not less than seventy, Oriental human be-
ings, males and females of various ages, whose names are 
unknown, occupants of the village of My Lai 4, by means of 
shooting them with a rifle.'m 
Bales was charged as follows: 
In that Staff Sergeant (E-6) Robert Bales, U.S. Army, did, at 
or near Belambay, Afghanistan, on or about 11 March 2012, 
with premeditation, murder a female of apparent Afghan de-
. cenl known as [redacted] by means of shooting her with a 
firearm. 31 
2~ US Department of the Army, Field Manual FM 27-10, Tiie law of land Wa!jare, 1956, 
507 . 
.Jo United Stales v. First lie11te11ant William L Calley, Jr, Charge Sheet, 5 September l 969, 
Specification I. A copy of Calley's charge sheet is appended to this chapter as Appendix 
3. Similar action was taken with respect to Calley's Company commander, Captain Emcst 
Medina. "In keeping with United States policy, Captain Medina was not charged with vio-
lations of the law of wur, but rather, was charged with violnlions of the UCMJ". Michael 
L. Smidt, "Yamashita, Medina, and Beyond: Command Responsibility in Contemporary 
Military Operations", in Militmy law Review, 2000, vol. 164, p. 194. 
·
11 United Slates v. Robert Bales, Charge Sheet, 23 March 2012 (redacted), Charge I, Specifi-
cation I. 
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The historian for the US Army Judge Advocate Generals' Corps 
claims tbat the US has never charged a US service member with a law of 
war violation as such. 32 But one commentator, Professor (and fonner 
Anny lawyer) Jordan Paust, claims that the US charged a service member 
during the Vietnam War with "cutting off an ear from the body of an un-
known dead Viet Cong soldier, which conduct was of a nature to bring 
discredit upon the Am1ed Forces of the United States as a violation of the 
Law of War". 33 
The legislative intent behind Rul • for Cou1t-Martial 307, or the 
commentary, provides no clarification.34 N ted Army legal scholars and 
military justice practitioners claim that as stated in the Manual for Courts-
Martia/ the US may court-martial a US service member for a violation of 
the law of war. 35 The US Congress has also failed to provide an answer, 
although it briefly discussed the issue in 1996. During the debate on the 
War Crimes Act, members of Congress discussed the potential for US 
service members to be court-martialled for violating the law of war and 
detennined that it "was not a viable option". 36 
12.2.4. Military Commissions 
The US military's internal practice stands in stark contrast to that of the 
military commissions, the stated purpose of which is to "try alien unprivi-
32 E-mail message from Fred Dorch to author, 6 November 2012. 
J.I Jordun Puust, "My Lai und Vietnam: Norms, Myths imd Leader Respon8ibility", in Mili-
tary law Review, 1972, vol. 57, p. 118 (reforring to U11ited States v Passanti110, Hq. 1st 
Inf Div. Special Court-Martial Order no. 11 , 11 February 1968) . 
.1
4 The analysis to the subsection of Ruic for Court-Martial 307 references charges under the 
law of war and refers to the 1969 Manual.for Courts-Martial. Yet that version of the man-
uul does not contain the language lhat "ordinarily" US service members should be charged 
with a violation of an enumerated punitive article of the UCMJ. The 1969 Manual even 
helpfully provides how to word a charge, saying that "[i]n the case of person subject to 
trial by general court-martial by the law of war[ ... ] the Charge should be: 'Violation of the 
Law of War'; or 'Violation of------,-------,' referring to the law penul law of the occupied 
territory''. Similarly, the very first US Manual .fiir Courts-Martial in 1949 included that 
"[t]he technical cllilrge should be appropriate to all specifications under it, and ordinary 
will be written: 'Violation of the __ Article of War,' giving the number of the ruticlc". 
35 Jan E. Akfykiewicz with Gco1lrey S. Corn, "Authority to Cou1t-Mmtial Non-U.S. Military 
Personnel for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed during In-
ternal Armed Conflicts", in Militw;v Law Review, 2001, vol. 167, p. 76. 
36 Ibid. 
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leged enemy belligerents for violations of the law of war''. 37 The Military 
Commissions Act of 2009 lists a host of law of war violations, including 
murder of a protected person, attacking civilian objects and property, pil-
laging and the denial of quarter. 38 In its zeal to charge law of war offences 
in the commissions, the US added the qualifier "in violation of the law of 
war" to other charges, such as murder and destruction of property, when 
110 such crimes exist, at least in the traditional, intemational conception of 
the law of armed conflict. 39 
For an example of how this disparity in charging its own service 
members versus its enemies plays out, consider what the specific criminal 
charge would be for desecrating human remains. In 201 I a US Marine 
scout-sniper unit pem1issibly engaged and killed several members of the 
Taliban in Afghanistan. Following the engagement, members of the unit 
videotaped themselves urinating on and posing with the bodies of the 
dead Taliban. The video was uploaded to YouTube in early 2012, went 
viral and drew widespread condemnation.40 The Marine Corps prosecuted 
those involved, but the closest punitive UCMJ article was dereliction of 
duty, Article 92. The maximum punishment for wilful dereliction in the 
performance of duties is confinement for six months, forfeiture of all pay 
and allowances, and a bad conduct discharge. 
While US service members have mistreated enemy remains, there is 
no specific charge for that misconduct, yet there is as applied to al-Qa'ida 
and the Taliban, despite the absence, thus far anyway, of their committing 
such acts. Under the Military Commissions Act of 2009 it is a crime for 
37 Milita1y Commissions Act of2009, 10 USC§ 948b(a) (2009). 
JB Military Commissions Act of2009, JO USC§ 950t(l) (2009). Given the US's opposition 
to the lnternntionnl Criminal Court ('ICC')., the similarities between criminal offences un-
der the ICC Statute and the Militruy Commissions Act of 2009 arc interesting. That a US 
citizen could not be subject to prosecution for such offences by military commission rein-
forces a common US stereotype : the US holds itself ton lower stnndard than that it claims 
other:; sh<mld meet under international law. 
39 See John C. Dehn, "The Hamdan Case and the Application of a Municipal Offence: The 
Common Law Origins of Murder in Violation of the Law of War" , in Journal <!f Interna-
tional Criminal Justice, 2009, vol. 7, no. I, p. 63 . 
40 
"Marine Pleads Guilty to Urinating on Corpses", in Fox News, 16 .Jrumary 2013, available 
at www.foxncws.com/us/2013/0 I/ I 6/.marine-faccs-court-martial-for-urinating-on-corpscs-
taliban-fighters-in/, last accessed at 30March2015. 
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an unprivileged enemy belligerent to intentionally mistreat a dead body. 41 
More significantly, the punishment for this offence is up to and including 
the death penalty. While there arc stark differences in that example others 
are not as clear-cut. Before the US approach can be more fully evaluated 
and discussed, clarifications to the tcnninology are warranted. 
12.3. Scope of War Crimes under US Law and International Law 
A common misconce~)tion is that any violation of the Geneva onvcn-
tions is •l war crime.4 First, the Conventions do not utiLise the term war 
crimes. Instead, each of the four Conventions details violations that con-
stitute a "grave breach" of the pa1ticular Convention. For those violations, 
States Parties have agreed to enact legislation to provide "effective penal 
sanction". 43 The Conventions refer to lesser violations as "other than 
grave breaches" for which States Parties agree to "take measures neces-
sary for the suppression" of such acts. 44 
In its study of international humanitarian law, the ICRC attempted 
to identify the customary international law principles of international hu-
manitarian law. Rule 156 of the study states that 'serious vio.lations of 
international humanitarian law constitute war ctimes".45 In response, the 
legal advisers to the US Departments of Defense and State wrote a letter 
41 US Military Commissions Act of 2009, § 950t(20). TI1e crime of intentionally mistreating 
a dead body is defined as "any person subject to this chapter [meaning non-US citizen 
members of al-Qa'ida and the Taliban, but not US service members] wlw intentionally 
mistreats the body of a dead person, without justification by legitimate military necessary, 
shall be punished as a militaiy commission under this chapter may direct". 
42 The US Army's own field manual on The Law of Land Warfare is, at least in part, to 
blame. It states, that "[t]he term 'war crime' is the technical expression for a violation of 
the law of war by any person or persons, military or civilian. Every violation of the law of 
war is a war crime"; Deportment of the Army, Field Manual 27-10. The Law o,f Land War-
.fare, Washington, DC, 1956, p. 499. 
43 Articles 49, 50, 129, 146 respectively of the Geneva Conventions I-IV; for acts constitut-
ing grave breaches, sec Articles 50, 51, 130, 147 respectively of the Geneva Conventions 
I-IV. 
44 ibid. 
45 Jean-Marie Henckaerts, "Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law: A Contri-
bution tn the Understanding and Respect for the Rule of Law in Armed Conflict", in lnter-
nalional Review o,fthe Red Cross: Custom111y Law, 2005, vol. 87, no. 857, p. 211, Ruic 
156. 
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to the ICRC claiming that the term war ciimes "is an amorpbous tenn 
used in djfferent contexts to mean di fferent things". 46 The US stated that: 
The national legislation cited in the commentary to Rule 157 
employs a variety of definitions of "war crimes," only a few 
of which closely parallel the definition apparently employed 
by the Study, and none that matches it exactly. Much of the 
legislation cited does not precisely define "war crimes"[ ... ]. 
Although the military manuals of Croatia, Hungary, and 
Switzerland, among others, appear to define "war crimes" as 
"grave breaches," the lack of specificity leaves the intended 
meaning ambiguous. Even among the few States that employ 
a de fini tion of "war crimes" similar to that in Rule 1567 no State definition mirrors the Study's definition prcciscly.4 
Part of the difficulty stems from what constitutes 'serious'. This is 
then compounded by the definition of international humanitarian law. US 
federal law and the Statute of the International Criminal Couii ('ICC') 
provide similar definitions which serve as a starting point for a compari-
son to their counterpart under the UCMJ. 
US federal law provides that 
[ w]hoever, whether inside or outside the United States, 
commits a war crime [ ... ] shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned for life or any term of years, or both, and if death 
results to the victim, shall also be subject to the penalty of 
death.48 
46 John B. Bellinger Ill and William J. Haynes II, "A US Government Response to the Inter-
national Committee of the Red Cross Study C11stoma1y Jnternalional Humcmitarian Law", 
in /11ternatio11al Review of the Red Cross, 2007, vol. 89, no. 866, p. 467. Rule 157 provides 




" War Crimes Act of 1996, 18 USC§ 2441 (1996). Under the federal law, the term "war 
crime" means any conduct: 
(J) defined as a grnve breach in any of the international conventions signed at Geneva 12 
August 1949, or any protocol to such convention to which the United States is a 
party; 
(2) prohibited by Article 23, 25, 27, or 28 of lhe Annex to lhe Hague Convention IV, Re-
specting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, signed 18 October 1907; 
(3) which constitutes a grave breach of common Article 3 (as defined in subsection (d)) 
when committed in the context of and in association with an armed conflict not of an 
international character; or 
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Pursuant to this approach, war crimes include grave breaches of any 
of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, certain articles from the 1907 Hague 
Convention IV, grave breaches of Article 3 common to each of the 1949 
Geneva Conventions, and certain violations of Protocol II of the Conven-
tion on Certain Convention Weapons, the Protocol on Prohibitions or Re-
strictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices. 
The ICC Statute defines war crimes as grave breaches of the 1949 
Geneva Conventions, "serious violations of the laws and customs" appli-
cable to international and other than international armed conflict, and se-
rious violations of Article 3 common to each of the I 949 Geneva Convcn-
tions.49 
12.4. Comparison of Elements of War Crimes and UCMJ Crimes 
How then do the elements (and punishments) of ICC Statute war crimes 
compare to an analogous charge under the UCMJ'? This section compares 
the following offences: wilful killing, committing outrages against per-
sonal dignity, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury and exten-
sive destruction of property. 
The elements for each war crime under the ICC Statute include that 
the conduct took place "in the context of and was associated with" an 
anned conflict and that the accused was aware of that conflict. Yet the 
introduction to the clements explains that: 
There is no requirement for a legal evaluation by the perpe-
trator as to the existence of an aimed conflict or its character 
as international or non-international; 
In that context there is no requirement for awareness by the 
perpetrator of the facts that established the character of the 
conflict as international or non-international; 
There is only a requirement for the awareness of the factual 
circumstances that established the existence of an armed 
(4) of a person who, in relation to an armed conflict and contrary to the provisions of the 
Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other 
Devices as amended at Geneva on 3 May 1996 (Protocol JI as mnended on 3 May 
1996), when the United States is a party to such Protocol, willfully kills or causes se-
rious injury to civilians. 
49 Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, in force I July 2002, 2187 
UNTS 90, Art. 8 ('ICC Statute'). 
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conflict that is implicit in the terms "took place in the con-
text of and was associated witih ".50 
12.4.1. Wilful Killing 
Article 8(2)(a)(i) of the ICC Statute provides the following elements for 
the crime of wilful killing to be committed in an international armed con-
flict: 
1. The perpetrator killed one or more persons. 
2. Such person or persons were protected under one or 
more ofthc Geneva Conventions of 1949. 
3. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances 
that established that protected status. 
4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associ-
ated with an international armed conflict. 
5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that 
established the existence of an armed conflict. 51 
Article J 18 of the UCMJ provides as follows: 
1. That a certain named or described person is dead. 
2. That the death resulted from the act or omission of the 
accused. 
3. That the killing was unlawful. 
4. That, at the time or the killing, the accused had a pre-
me<li tated design to kil I. 52 
The maximum punishment under the UCMJ is death. There is a 
mandatory minimtm1 of imprisonment for life with eligibility for parole. 
For the ICC crimes, the maximum punishment for war crimes is "life im-
prisonment when justified by the extreme gravity of the crime and the in-
dividual circumstances of the convict d per on''. 53 
On the surface, the differences between the UCMJ and the ICC 
Statute are a higher mens rea in case of the UCMJ (premeditation) and the 
fact that wilful killing under the ICC requires proving both the protected 
50 International Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes, Doc. no. ICC-ASP/1/3 (part 11-B), 9 
September 2002, Art. 8. 
51 Ibid., Art. 8(2)(a)(i). 
52 Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 USC§ 918, Art. 118, 2010. 
53 ICC Statute, Art. 77(1 ), see supra note 49. 
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status of the victim and the underlying existence of an armed conflict. 
Qualitatively, wilful killing is a more circumspect offence, proscribing a 
rule not against any wilful killing, but the wilful killing of a certain class 
of victims - protected persons. 
Could Staff Sergeant Bales be charged with wilfol killing? Even 
with the expansion of protected person status to include ethnicity and not 
just nationality,54 the alleged victims were not protected peTsons for the 
purposes of the Geneva Conventions. They were Afghan nationals, alleg-
edly killed in Afghanistan by a member of the US military when the US 
military was neither fighting against nor occupying Afghanistan, but in-
stead aiding the government of Afghanistan in its counter-insurgency ef-
forts. Thus, while the offence of wilful killing is uniquely tailored to 
anned conflict, it proves less useful in certain conflict-based settings than 
the more general murder charge under the UCMJ. 
12.4.2. Maltreatment of Persons 
Article 8(2)( c )(ii) of the Elements of Crimes outlines the elements of the 
crime "outrages upon personal dignity" as follows: 
1. The perpetrator humiliated, degraded or otherwise vio-
lated the dignity of one or more persons. 
2. The severity of the humiliation, degradation or other 
violation was of such degree as to be generally recog-
nized as an outrage upon personal dignity. 
3. The conduct took place in the context of and was associ-
ated with an international anned conflict. 
4. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that 
established the existence of an armed conflict. 
In Article 93 of the UCMJ cruelty and maltreatment are defined as: 
I. That a certain person was subject to the orders of the ac-
cused. 
2. That the accused was cruel toward, or oppressed, or mal-
treated that person. 
In the UCMJ the maximum punishment is dishonourable discharge, 
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confinement for one year. Once 
54 International Criminal Tribunal for the fmmcr Yugoslavia ('ICTY'), Prosecutor v. Ti-
l10111ir Blaskic, Case No IT-95-14-T, Appeals Chamber, 3 March 2000, p. 3. 
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more the ICC Statute provides for a maximum term of 30 years or life in 
particularly grave circumstances. Attention is immediately drawn to the 
brevity of the UCMJ charge (it contains only two elements) as well as the 
disparity between possible punishments: one year compared to 30 years. 
Arguably, the UCM.T charge is not analogous to the ICC offence, or cer-
tainly not a complete equivalent. The UCMJ charge requires that the vic-
tim be subject to the orders of the accused. While being subject to orders 
is broadly defined, it is nonetheless a significant limitation on the applica-
tion of the charge. Finally, under the UCMJ offence the victim must be 
alive. By comparison, an outrage against personal dignity better lends it-
self to the misconduct that occurs during armed conflict, particularly to-
wards corpses. 55 For outrages against personal dignity, the Elements of 
Crimes provides that '"persons' can include dead persons. It is understood 
that the victim need not personally be aware of the existence of the hu-
miliation or degradation or other violation. This element takes into ac-
count relevant aspects of the cultural background of the victim".56 
12.4.3. Wilfully Causing Great Suffering or Serious Injury 
ICC A1ticle 8(2)(a)(iii) provides that the crime of wilfully causing b1fcat 
suffering or serious injury to body or health occurs when: 
1. The perpetrator caused great physical or mental pain or 
suffering to, or serious injury to body or health of, one 
or more persons. 
2. Such person or persons were protected under one or 
more of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. 
3. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances 
that established that protected status. 
4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associ-
ated with an international armed conflict. 
55 For example, some of the actions US service members have taken in recent years in Iraq 
could fall within this crime, notably the Abu Ghraib abuses. As the detainees were subject 
to the orders of the US military guards, cruelty and maltreatment could (and did) apply. In 
such situations, the question becomes whether a maximum sentence of one-year confine-
ment is adequate. 
56 International Criminal Court, 2002, Art. 8(2){c)(ii), see supra note 50. 
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5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that 
established the existence of an armed conflict. 57 
According to Article 128 of the UCMJ aggravated assault occurs in 
the following circumstances: 
I. That the accused attempted to do, offered to do, or did 
bodily harm to a ce11ain person; 
2. That the accused did so with a certain weapon, means, or 
force; 
3. That the attempt, offer, or bodily harm was done with 
unlawful force or violence; and 
4. That the weapon, means, or force was used in a manner 
likely to produce death or grievous bodily hann. 58 
There are a number of subsets of this offence, including when a 
firearm is used and when it is committed against a child under the age of 
I 6 years. Absent one of those qualifiers, the maximum punishment is a 
dishonourable discharge, forfeitw·e of all pay and allowances, and con-
finement for three years. 
Of the ofiences being compared, these two (wilfully causing great 
suffering and aggravated assault) may be the most similar. Interestingly, 
the UCMJ version applies to attempts and completed acts, while the ICC 
offence only applies to the completed acts. The ICC offence encompasses 
mental pain or suffering while the UCMJ version is limited to bodily 
harm. Again disparity between the possible punishment arises: the ICC 
crime yields a sentence range up to 30 years while the UCMJ is generally 
limited to three years. Even when the qualifiers are considered, the UCMJ 
punishment only increases to five years for a child victim and eight years 
when a firearm is used. 
12.4.4. Destruction of Property 
The crime of extensive destruction and appropriation of property is de-
fined in the ICC Statute as occurring when: 
l . The perpetrator destroyed or appropriated certain prop-
erty. 
51 Ibid., A11icle 8(2)(a)(iii). 
58 Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 USC § 928, Alt. 128, 2010. 
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2. The destruction or appropriation was not justified by 
military necessity. 
3. The destruction or appropriation was extensive and car-
ried out wantonly. 
4. Such prope11y was protected under one or more of the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949. 
5. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances 
that established that protected status. 
6. The conduct took place in the context of and was associ-
ated with an international armed conflict. 
7. The perpetrator was aware of fac1L1al circumstances that 
established the existence of an armed con.flict. 59 
Article I 03 of the UCMJ provides that the crime oflooting or pi!-
!aging captured or abandoned property occurs in the following circum-
stances: 
1. That the accused engaged in looting, pillaging, or loot-
ing and pillaging by unlawfully seizing or appropriating 
certain public or private property; 
2. That this property was located in enemy or occupied ter-
ritory, or that it was on board a seized or captured ves-
sel; and 
3. That this property was: 
(i) left behind, owned by, or in the custody of the en-
emy, an occupied state, an inhabitant of an occu-
pied state, or a person under the protection of the 
enemy or occupied state, or who, immediately 
prior to the occupation of the place where the act 
occurred, was under the protection of the enemy or 
occupied state; or 
(ii) part of the equipment of a seized or captured ves-
sel; or 
(iii) owned by, or in the custody of the officers, crew, 
or passengers on board a seized or captured ves-
sel. ''0 
59 ICC Statute, Art. 8(2)(a)(iv), see supra note 49. 
6ll Uniform Code ofMilitaiy Justice, 10 USC§ 903, Art. 103, 2010. 
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The maximum punishment is "any punishment, other than death, 
that a court-martial may direct". 61 
The striking foature of the UCMJ charge is that it represents a rare 
US militaiy offence - one that only applies to armed conflict or during 
times of military occupation. Although anachronistic, this offence none-
theless demonstrates the potential for broader offences unique to armed 
contlict to apply to US service members. 
12.5. Assessment and Proposal 
The above discussion demonstrates that in some ways the crimes in the 
UCMJ and the ICC Statute are analogous, but in other ways they arc not. 
The enumerated UCMJ offences are more generalised, allowing for appli-
cation during both peacetime garrison settings and during armed conflict. 
But in that generalisation, it can be claimed that something is lost. Is the 
same offence in a garrison setting really the same as when it is committed 
in an armed conflict? For intra-military offences, for example, one service 
member assaulting another, the answer may be yes. But where the victim 
of the offence is not American and the armed forces are deployed in an 
armed conflict environment, the answer would appear to be no. The ques-
tion becomes whether the various intrinsic and extrinsic values the US 
military justice system - designed to promote, protect and defend - oper-
ate in a domestic setting in the same manner as they do in an armed con-
flict. 
Part of the difficulty stems from the lack of awareness of the US 
approach, even among legislators tasked with developing US law. In the 
mid- l 990s, the US Congress was debating what ultimately became the 
War Crimes Act of 1996, which criminalised law of war violations com-
mitted by or against US nationals. 62 A report accompanying the legisla-
tion stated that "[t]hc Uniform Code of Military Justice grants court-
martial jurisdiction to try individuals for violations of the laws of war". 63 
The report then claimed that "[t]he most famous example of a court mar-
tial for war crimes is probably that of William Calley, who was prose-
61 ibid. 
62 War Crimes Act of J 996. While the Act was progress, it only lessened the jurisdictional 
loophole in the US. Law of war violations committed by other than US nationals against 
anyone who is not a US national and which occur outside the US arc not criminalised. 
1
'
3 US House of Representatives, I louse Report 104-698, 24 July 1996, p. 5. 
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cuted for his pa1t in the Mai Lai massacre during the Vietnam War". 64 Yet 
as discussed, the US military did not charge Calley with war crimes, it 
charged him with mmder. But the US charges were based on substantially 
the same misconduct as would a charge of a crime against humanity, and 
the possible punishment for murder under the UCMJ - death - exceeds 
that of the ICC Statute. 
Ultimately, there are some crimes and offences which seem to be 
more fully and fairly represented by enumerated punitive articles of the 
UCMJ than others. And the US military practice at least adequately com-
pares with the ICC. Where the US charging practice fares poorly is the 
comparison between how it charges with its own service members versus 
members of al-Qa'ida and the Taliban for similar conducts constituting 
similar violations of the law of anned contlict. The US most certainly en-
deavours to hold its service members accountable for their violations of 
the law of armed conflict. But that it does so differently compared to how 
it holds its enemies accountable is problematic. 
Given the state of the United States' long history, charging its ser-
vice members with law of war violations or war crimes as such, while 
feasible, is not likely realistic. But surely the US military can adopt some 
new pw1itive articles that reflect the armed conflict-related mi!lconduct 
committed by US service members since 2001. The US could also miti-
gate this criticism if it were more transparent about how it meets its obli-
gations under international humanitarian law, which the US approach to 
charging its service members renders even more difficult. 
The Geneva Conventions require that States "provide effective pe-
nal sanctions for persons committing, or orde1·ing to be committed, any of 
the grave breaches".65 Yet the US approach to how it charg s its -crvice 
members hampers the ability to separate out examples of where the US 
has enforced its obligations (court-martial of a US service member under 
Article 118 for killing an Iraqi civilian, for example) from other actions 
under the UCM.T (court-martial of a US service member under Article 118 
for killing another US service member). Until 2013, none of the US mili-
tary services publicly reported their court-martial results. In 2013 the 
United States Navy became the first to do so, which is progress but which 
64 Ibid. 
"~ Articles 49, 50, 129 and 146 respectively of the Geneva Conventions I-IV. 
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at same time underscores tbe ripple effects of the US charging approach. 66 
As part of a wider effort to be more transparent about prosecuting service 
members through the military justice system, the Navy published the re-
sults of 135 special and general courts martial which occurred between 
January and June 2013. For example, one entry reads as follows: 
At a Special Court-Martial in Washington, D.C., an E-3 was 
tried for assault consummated by a battery. The panel of 
members retumed a verdict of not guilty to assault consum-
mated by a battery, but guilty to simple assault. The panel 
awarded a forfeiture of $1,342 per month for 2 months, re-
duction in rank to E-1 and 40 days confinement. 
This is a significant (albeit long overdue) step and which the entire 
US military services should emulate. Unfortunately, it is of minimal util-
ity in tenns of demonstrating US compliance witb its obligations under 
the Geneva Conventions. The court-martial result listed above does not 
reveal whether that case involved a violation of the law of war or not. We 
know that a court-martial panel acquitted a sailor of assault consummated 
by a battery and found the sailor guilty of simple assault. It is possible, 
though extremely unlikely, that the sailor's actions took place in Afghani-
stan and that the victim of the assault was a civilian, thus potentially i m-
plicating the laws of war. 
How the military charges its service members generally, combined 
with how the Navy is reporting results, amount to a missed opportunity to 
demonstrate not just transparency of the UCMJ process but how the US 
complies with its Geneva Convention obligations. 
66 
"Document: Navy Comt-Martial Summaries from Jan. to June 2013", in USNI News, 
24 July 2013, available at http://ncws.usni.org/2013/07/24/<locumcnl-navy-court-marlial-
summaries-from-jan-to-junc-20 l3, last accessed at 30 March 2015. Sec also "Navy Re-
leases Six Months of Co1111-Ma1tial Results", in Navy Times, 22 July 2013, available at 
hltp://archive.navytimcs.com/article/20 I 30722/NEWS06/30722003 3/Navy-releases-six-
months-court-martial-rcsults, last accessed at 30 March 2015. The US Army also now re-
leases court-martial results and in a similar fashion to the US Navy. See "Army Releases 
Court-Martial Verdicts for December", in Army Times, 23 January 2015, available at 
http:f/www.armytimcs.com/story/mi litary/crimc/20 15/01/23/-criminal-vcrdicts-dischargc-
results/22225147 /,last accessed at 30 March 2015. 
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12.6. Conclusion 
One senior US military prosecutor has commented that charging decisions 
ultimately reflect the narrative the prosecutor wants to convey to a jury. It 
is difficult to envision a case where adding elements, including the exis-
tence of armed conflict or of a protected person, would render that en-
deavour easier. A pragmatic approach to prosecutions is not unique to the 
() .67 The differences may be explained by degrees - a domestic military 
charge would apply to a Lower-ranking individual, whereas a 'war crimi-
nal' must be an authority figure. Or, it could be argued that property de-
struction is appropriately addressed by the UCMJ, and that a war crime 
act of the same conduct would, or should, constitute a graver crime. 
Yet the US approach rings hollow, maybe not in an absolute sense 
but certainly in a relative one. The US has been involved in armed con-
flict for over 10 years and is, accordingly to a commentator in an era of 
"persistent conflict"68 which will exist for "the next several decades".69 
This negates an argument that armed conflicts are not long enough to war-
rant unique military charges. 70 Nor is the argument that specific offences 
should only exist when they occur with some degree of frequency particu-
larly persuasive, given the offences in the UCMJ such as abusing a public 
animal and hazarding a vessel. But fatally problematic for the US pragma-
tism argumeut is that law of war offences are detailed and empl yed 
against detaLnees subject to US military commissions. 71 For either reason, 
67 Interview with Beth Van Schaack, Deputy Chief of the US Office of Global Criminal Jus-
tice, describing actions by JCTY prosecutors to employ charges that obviate the need for 
conflict classification and the use of joint criminal enterprise as a more effective modality 
than traditional forms of com1mu1d responsibility. 
6K Pete Geren and George W. Casey Jr, A Statement 011 the Posture oft/re United States Army 
2009, Department of the Army, Washington, DC, 2009. 
69 See also Mary L. Dudziak, War Time: A11 Idea. Its History, Its Consequences, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2012, arguing that war is not an exceptional state but the unfor-
tunate status quo. 
70 Moreover, ns discussed above, the US military manual for colllts martial has for some time 
contained a fow conflict specific offences. 
71 This inconsistent approach to the way in which the US charges its service members versus 
the enemy is not new. During the Second World War, the US Army court-martiaUcd its 
own service members for killing enemy prisoners of war for murder, while prosecuting 
Germans who committed similar acts against US POWs for violations of the laws and cus-
toms of war. Sec General Military Government Court at Dachau, Germany, U.S. v. Valen-
tin Bers in et al., USO 11 Case no. 6·24, 1945-1948. 
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and certainly for both reasons, the US should modify the charges em-
ployed against its own service members. 
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Appendix 1: Charge Sheet of Staff Sergeant Robert Bales 
l . NMOll CF llCWSF.ll IU•l - MQ 
Bii liBS ROBliR'r 
Headquarteu and He11dquarte11 Company 
CHARGE SHEET 
2d Ba~allon, Jd lnfanl~ Rcslmenl (Rear) (Provialon•I) 
Joint Base Lowis·McChnrd, WO!hinglon 98433 
r, P 'Pt.OMOffflt 
l. HMtc 
$3243.30 
11.h HARO I 
14 Jan 09 6Yo1rs 
II Mar 12 - present 
Sl'IJCll'ICA'l10N I: In I hat Su.ff S. CfiCOol (E.-6) Robert Raju, U. S. Army, did, 11 nr 110>< Bol1mba~lslan1 on 
or nb<1u1 11 Mnroh 2012. wilh p1c111odla.1io11. murder a fon1•lc ora(l!IUl'nl Alghon d .. oonl lcnown u~y means 
or.hoollng ti... whl1 a n rc•rm. 
SPliCll'ICA 'l'ION 2: In lh•l StoifSergo•111 (ll·6) Robon &1 .. , U. S. llm1y, dkl, ot or """r llclln1l"Y· A fgl:nnlslon, on 
ornbOlll 11Morch2011, with pn:111odl111lo11, murdor a malo ofapp1ra1l Atah1n delcont ~11own .... , - y moona 
or shoo1lng him l"ith o nrconn. 
SPl!CIPICATION J: 111 lh•I SlJlrfSttyi:i1111 (l!r6) Rub<rt B•IOI, U.S. Am1y, did, 11or 11011 flel•mllllr. Af11hn1l11011, au 
0r !!li!11i' I l Mnn:h 2012, with pr<n1odll•tion, murtkr 1 mnlo of •ppomll Af11h•n ~ .. cent kn.;wn •• I • I 
•1•1 •••••1•1•1"~ mton• of1hoo1lng him willu 1'11<onn. 
SPECIFICATION ~: In lilt\\ Slaff Scitgconl (B-6) Robert Balea, U. S. Army, did, •I ur noar Bolombay, Afghanislon, on 
or about 11 Man:h 2012, with premedlta!lon, murder o fcmalo ofapporcnl Afghan d.,cent by mean• of shoo1ln11 her 
with o li~11m1. 
(Sl!ll CONTINUATION SHF.llT) 
Al'l'IDAVrl': nelbre me, 111<1ulldc,.Jgne<li1nthorJ<Cli by l1w 10 admln1J1cr 011t!il ln • ..., oflh1'<h11J10ler, pe11onnlly 
•ppoan:d !till abovo 1111111td a.aauior 1hll _~-~- d~y of M .. 1l~I 2012, •n~ llgntd tlic forogolng 
olltu'pt tnd spcclRatlons Uttdcr oath 1ho1hdt.ho111 pol!IOll subject lo 1ho llnifonn Code ofMlll1ory J11t1lto lllld lhnt 
hoi&llt clil\or hllJ peRuDll ~"""'"""'or or lllL'l l.nYC>llg&!•d th• motlcr• 001 fullh '"""'"' 'llld Uiol tho (Offill llO lruo lil 
lho boSI or ltiilhor knowt.dgo uid .belJof. 
t.JZJZ 
Judge Advocale 
PRli\llOUB llllTIOH II OUOl.STIL 
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Appendix 2: Charge Sheet of the US Military Commissions 
CHARGE llHEET 
l Jllldal>IAL OAT-' 
I. NAME OF AllCU811P: 
ABO AL HAOI AL·IRAQI 
2. Al.JASU OF ACCUUO: 
see ATTACHED APPENDIX A 
J , t9N tlUU.O!.R or ACCU9ED ,L~T 10Uill't! 
10026 
n. CtlAftoe• AHO •PICD'IOATTOKO 
4. CllJJIOI: VIOLATION OF 8ECTION AHD 11Tl..E OF ClllllB llt PART IY OF •M.C. 
IP&OIFIOATIOH: 
SEEATTACHEO CONTINUATION SHEET OF BLOCK II. CHARGES AND SPECIFICATIONS 
!Ir. liwv.Rllfll Of OHARQf..9 
... NAMI OP AOCUIBll (lA!IT. 11111ar, ., I ... GRAii .. le-, .,...._.......,,,..... 11..,_.Q, ilCCUHlt 
TAWIL. KHALIL, M . CPTI0-3 Oftlce of the ChlllfProsecu1or, OMC 
... s10z1<110• ·~z. v ...... TB IT , ......... , 
o-.)/(. e;· ~ 20130807 
N'FIDAVIT; O.loto111t,h_>!f,.... Ol)"""'1M0-,'°''°-lt'"' ... ,., .. ,.,O!lllltdwo<"'·..,..""ll'-"'"" ......... _ 
-llll..l!IJ...OlyOl~ • ...i!!.l.L-... _ ... ""ogol!lo"""Dll""'4>o< .... , ___ , ............. ,,.._ 
11U1'ftc!IJo tN ~ COOtolWu rtJULlb •lid lh:111hllJ11 .. ka.pa-mNJ\IJilorf'llla;• ltlor,..mlllllllld IWl'l\lltl'lfft~~·~ani::i 
ll11t,lho"4•'411t~~ 1q.~M\lol~1~/llOWftD,g•.ndtllllf 
MARY K. KRIVCA omc. or Milllll!X Commiulona 
'l!Nd-OI~ _.,Olbr 
LTCIO-li Ji!Slgl&!illa111-8!Jldo rn2ff}(1 ), Ul;IM 
!tt4fr~ Olibol~rloMm••O'" a.<o (oHR"1C:J01fO)<_, .. __ I 
MC FORM 458 JAN 2007 
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CONTINUATION SllEKT- MC Form 4.!IR (Jon 200'7) - C1mt1nm1llon of lhe 
Chnl'll'\I and Spoetncallon11 In tha caaufUNITRI> S'rA'l'l'8 <JI>' AMRIUCA v. ADD 
i\I. IJAUI Al.-lKAQI 
CllAKCiK I: VIOl.A'nON OF' 10 U.S.C. § 9501111), UKNYING QUAKTl~R 
Sl'l•:L:U'ICATION: In 1ha1 Abd al H~ttl J-fmlji t"Abd al Mmll"I ("" Apf".'lldix A iu 
11.i ur 11U1~'ll:~J . n pcn;on subjecl 10 uial by 111 llwy con1111iHslnn a.~ un ulic11 unprivileged 
1mcmy bclllt:cn:111, diet, rrom in or abom 2003 It> in ur uhum 21104 , n1 nwhiptc l('('ntion~ in 
llllll 11mund t\rJ!,hu ni~IM il!lll Ptlld•Uln, in lhll CUllleJLI uf lllld U!'..;tJCilllCd Wllh ho.~I 1 1liC!~, 
while In 11 JIQllilion nr c1Tcc1ivo co1nn1:1mJ ru1d conlrol over ~11liordi111110 fun:c~. chx:hm:. 
unlcr. umt uthcrwillll lndicalo to 1hose forc11111h111 then: Kb11ll be nu Hurvive1rs, when ii Willi 
fou\N:.unl•lu thul clrcu111>IURCO$ wout.i be such dmt u p111<:1i1mhl11und1'l!:~unublo ubility to 
11t-cc111 . urn:ndcr would UJ(i~l. with 11Jc l111en1 lu condu1:1 ho.'llilili1."K s~<:.h 1hul there would 
be 1111 survlwn1. 
Pugo 7 or Ill 
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"ONTINIJATION SlllCl.;J' - MC Form 4511ttau2tHl7)- C:onlln11nlln11 or the 
l:1111r~1·s 11111.I Spcclfki1Uo115 In lh11 C'1m' of UNl'l'Jm S'J'A'l1\.<; OJI AMgru .Av. ADD 
A.L UADI AIARAQJ 
CllAlt<ll\ Ill VJOJ,ATION Qlo' JO US.C. § 9.501(4), A'l"l'ACKING PRO'l1ECTED 
PIWl'l\H'I'\' 
S l'l>:t:l l•'I • \ TION: 111 I hut /\t>d ul Htldl 1ll-ln111l C"Alxl ul H1ull") ti..:" App..,mlix A for 1 
lisi 11r 111i11~""'· 11 1i.•n1Un ~ultiCl.'l lo triul by 111Ul1u1y c.:11 111111 ~ inn u_, 1111 ul en 11111,nvlhisc!I 
c11c1u)' l•clHgc1'c1u, Jld, ou or ubom 29 Sc1>1c111!-:r :!00.\, ul '"' nl!J•r hkln, Af11h mi~tu11. ill 
the 1.:111111: l" 1111d 11,.,~u.;in1ctl w th h tllll ll!>-, ln1cnlio1111Jly 11l\11~· k 11111llh111'Y 11wdk11I 
holl. ''""''" which w1 pr<>1ccl•'ll pmpeny under 1hc '""'" nr v11r 11~ . m1lh11ry med 1 
uir.-rnn ll\:11tl11g 1hc emblem uni.I di 1l11~"1ivc i&n oftl1c McrJ1c I Sec kc uf 1ir111cd. fc>rCCI\, 
tu I ill the 1"'11Cl'tlS>011 II Whilo ground, hy 01•i11~11l ~11llJ 111ilit11ry n .. 'IJk 111 lil"O!'ICr n ii 
11111rn111111d 111 uvoc11 1.: n United S111ll:., mlll1ury c1 suulty ln•1111l11: h1ml11!iclil , whi h 
pt'<M.:lcd 1 n11 ·rly wnx Ou~ obJC4'1 Ui' the 1111 uk .mil Ahil ul Ii 1d l 1,uew oml ~l1Uuld lmvc 
kuuwn of 1hc ruclual clruumHIQllQC~ Lhat et1lubll11hed 1he 111llll11ry 111cdtcol hcl1~1plor'~ 
pn l<..'1.'l•l\I ~hllU~. 
'11tc A~-c:uli\XI i~ linblo tor lite ubove 11llCJ1l~ nffc11Sll 11s u 1ulnctpnl und u co-cun~plm1or. 
uncl WI u 1mrti~ipun1 ln n comn111n pl1111. u. 'Cl forlh In I00 "'-'1:Ll1m 1111tlth11l k 01111 11u11 
Alh:1.1ulions" which Ix hereby 11:-otllctrcd atnll incllr)'orutcd hy rclorcntc u.~ Ir 111:1 ftlrth fully 
l11:n:l11. 
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t'ON'flNllA'l'JON SHEE1' - MC F_,tm ~8 (Jqn 200'7) - C1m1l1111alhm of lhe 
Ch11r11l!H nnd S11eclncntlo111i In Iha C11110 of UNITED STA1'1lS 01<" AMllRICA v. ARD 
Al. llADI AJ.-IRAQI 
CllAllHK Ill: VU>l.ATION OF 10 U.S.C. ~ 950&(171, USINCi 'l'IUt.AClll~Kl' OK 
Pl~RlllL>V 
Sl'Jo: "I FlCA'l'ION I: In Ihm AM 111 Hud i u1-1nll)i ("' Ahd 11! I l ~di' ' J (i<c~ A1 j1"Ut.h~ I\ for 
a ll~L "' ulmlll!sJ. u p1m:o11 ~11bj ~c1 r inul hy ruilirnry c; 1l11u11!~s inn ui. 111111J i~ 11 unprlvllct:.:d 
~11~111 )' hcllli,tcrcr11 , dill. 11 or bo111 7 June 200 • • 111ur 11cm t<11h11J . Arglumi 11111. in rhc 
comi:x1 or 1111<1 n.~nciu1cc.l wirh lt011lill1ie11. Invite the: ~'tlnlilknto 111111 belief uf 11t h:u.,l U11c 
pc111un 11111111v.:hicle 1IPf!Cl1rlng 10 be c v~I no ' 'chict• WWI ~n1illw 10 prutc:c:litm 11ntlcr 1ho 
Juw nf wnr, 11nl). i11t.:11dii1g It• ' '' 1111d lx-(rny 1hm conrKl<:n~ :inti heller, did. lh~rcnl\ct , 
maki: lltK: 11( lhnl eunfidcm:c 1111d belief lo delon11te explORiVCll in ~uhl vehicle alongside n 
hUM Clll'r}'fllJI Ci~l111Rll 1llflit11t)' OICJllbln. rc:.~ullin~ in dcnth 111111 i1tjury lo ;;II (clllll OllCl 
fll:t'lillll, 
SJ'l( 'Jiii ' \ 'l'ION 2: In 1(1111 AbJ ul Hnlll Ul·lmqi l"Abd ol Hlldl"J (!K:C 1\p1icmJi,_ A for 
11 h~111fal :L•1i.l. 111111rsun ~ubjcc1 m uiul by 11111!urry cnmmi5slun w; nn 1illc11 unprlvllcJP!d 
1mc11111 l.!l!lllS1!tenl, dlll, on or 11buu1 28 Jonunry ~.11111r n11ur Kubul, ACJbuni8t!Ul, in Iha 
i:on10~1 11f nm.I UMioolutcll with hlllilililies, invilO 1111: conli1k:n~-c und bolicr of ul li;"llSI one 
f1<.•n.on 1h11111 \chide ~1•1>11Pnng 10 be u civilinn vehicle w;,.·1mtillet.110 pml~ctiun 111111cr 
lhc J;iw uf Wiit, nnd. inlcmJinj! IO UllC II/Ill hc1n1y 1h111 !.'on0dcncc :Ind bcllcl'. did. lhcre111\cr. 
111.1ka 1111\? n! lhill i:onli<lcncc und he lier 10 dctomllc cxplo~iw., in ~uh.I ~l111• le ulnnttJ idc u 
i::oalllillJl convoy cu.rrylnl! Urlri~h ;u1d ~tonlw1 mllhury m~111hcn1, 1u, 111li113 l11 li~111h and 
injury tu 111 lcu~t orie Nr.;on. 
'1111: AcCU!lc:d I~ Jl111!lc for the ilbovc wlap:d ofrc111c,; U 11prlnclplll11111 a Cl,l-COlt~piralOI, 
uml u~ a 1111nicipun1 in a connnon plun, 11., Kl fonh In Ille: llCCtion onlltled ''Conunon 
Allcg111innH" which ia hu<lby rc·nllegcd and inco'll<lrwed ~y rcf¢ro11c;1: u.~ if lkll forth fully 
ltcrcln. 
l'llJC 9 ot J() 
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CON'l'INUA'l'ION SlllmT- MC Form 4$8 (J11n ZOU7J - Coullnu11l1011 ur lhe 
Chnr1l!ll 11nd Rpecfnt11llon$ Ill lhe CIUl1I of UNITED S'l'ATHS OJI AMmUCA y, ADD 
Al, HADI Af,•IR.r\Ql 
CllARGI~ JV: VIO i .l\1'10N 01 10U.S.C.!i11501128), A1TKMP1'1m USlt OF 
TllRA Hl~RV OR l'lrn.PLDY 
SPl(CJl~ ICA lON: In !hat Alld 111 Mndl ul -lnicJi ("/\bl.I ~I Mlldl-J r ~c.l Ap11c11ll x A ror u 
11.-1 or nllnsesJ. '' r• l'M'lll sul>je<:I 10 1 fol by 11~ili111ry rnimnl siun ns nn 11llu11 unprlvilcgr:ll 
cn.,1ny hc ll ig~~n 1 . iJld. o~ ur nbtM 29 Mnr.:h l OIH. 111 or near JoM11hnJ. 1\fg'lm11i 1 n. iu 
ti!" coore~I or uull 1swclu tcd with bo, 111i1 lc:<. w!ch •he p..'Glli l11i.•111 111 •onunli lhc 
uffon ·c of fu~ Tru:1ch ry or Pcrlldy t HI U,S.C.-! 9SOU 17 t). invhc 1h" <:u11fiilcncc u11ll 
llcll~r or 111 lc111n nnu l"':lliOR 1tuu a Y•hicli! lltlJa!rlni to be o civilian Vt!hlL'I~ wo~ 1!1llillcd 
11.'1 fllnlcet Otl ll lliJDr lh " li\IN nrwt1r, nml, flll 'lllling IU UJ;I! ~niJ 1Jcm 1y ihlll <'Oil dunce 11nd 
hillier, tlld, 1hcn:11 flcr. l!l ~ l:c "~or lluil (" nlidom:u nnd llilllcr10 Ull mp\ 1e11l11ummu 
CxtJlv~i ve~ in x11i11 v..:hlclc al on~. de n l'.Uuvoy l~1 rry1n!! United Stoic~ 111ilil ltr')' •nembcrs 
whl1 lhn i111e111 1n Jilli 1ntl il\lurc ll 1¢ll.ll one 1 1'1\on . 
TI1c Accuk!il ill linhle fur 1h nbo'' ~ll~i;c<l offo 11Ml u~ 11prlnd1wcl 11n.J 111: , , ·uu pimtnr. 
and as o po11icil)illll ln u crn11nn>11 phm. u" . ·1 funh in the ~1.:1 un em ii led "\lumuon 
AU~.gnrlnH" which 1~ hereby re-llllcaed ~nd in~'<>rp.)nlleJ by refe~n~ un if lil!I li)11h f111ly 
l\.:iti11 . 
Pu11u IO ul' 10 
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Appendix 3: Charge Sheet of First Lieutenant William L. Calley 
Charge : Violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, A1iicle 118 
Specification I: In that First Lieutenant William L. Calley, Jr., US Army, 
40th Company, The Student Brigade, US Army Infantry School, Fort 
Benning, Georgia (then a member of Company C, 1st Battalion, 20th In-
fantry) did, at My Lai 4, Quang Ngai Province, Republic of South Viet-
nam, on or about 16 March 1968, with premeditation, murder four Orien-
tal human beings, occupants of the village of My Lai 4, whose names and 
sexes are unknown, by means of shooting them with a rifle. 
Specification 2: In that First Lieutenant William L. Calley, Jr., US Anny, 
40th Company, The Student Brigade, US Army Infantry School, Fort 
Benning, Georgia (then a member of Company C, 1st Battalion, 20th In-
fantry) did, at My Lai 4, Quang Ngai Province, Republic of South Viet-
nam, on or about 16 March 1968, with premeditation, murder an unknown 
number, not less than 30, Oriental human beings, males and females of 
various ages, whose names are unknown, occupants of the village of My 
Lai 4, by means of shooting them with a rifle. 
Specification 3: In that First Lieutenant William L. Calley, Jr., US Army, 
40th Company, The Student Brigade, US Army infantry School, Fort 
Benning, Georgia (then a member of Company C, 1st Battalion, 20th In-
fantry) did, at My Lai 4, Quang Ngai Province, Republic of South Viet-
nam, on or about 16 March 1968, with premeditation, murder three Orien-
tal human beings whose names and sexes are unknown, occupants of the 
village of My Lai 4, by means of shooting them with a rifle. 
Specification 4: In that First Lieutenant William L. Calley, Jr., US Army, 
40th Company, The Student Brigade, US Army Infantry School, Fort 
Benning, Georgia (then a member of Company C, 1st Battalion, 20th In-
fantry) did, at My Lai 4, Quang Ngai Province, Republic of South Viet-
nam, on or about I 6 March 1968, with premeditation, murder an unknown 
number of Oriental human beings, not less than seventy, males and fe-
males of various ages, whose names are unknown, occupants of the vil-
lage of My Lai 4, by means of shooting them with a rifle. 
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